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The security analysis of quantum key distribution is difficult to perform when there is efficiency
mismatch between various threshold detectors involved in an experimental setup. Even the verifica-
tion that the device actually performs in the quantum domain, referred to as the task of entangle-
ment verification, is hard to perform. In this article we provide such an entanglement-verification
method for characterized detection-efficiency mismatch. Our method does not rely on a cut-off of
photon numbers in the optical signal. It can be applied independently of the degrees of freedom
involved, thus covering, for example, efficiency mismatch in polarization and time-bin modes, but
also in spatial modes. The evaluation of typical experimental scenarios suggests that an increase
of detection-efficiency mismatch will drive the performance of a given setup out of the quantum
domain.
I. Introduction
The ability to verify effective entanglement in observed
data is a necessary condition for Alice and Bob to per-
form secure quantum key distribution (QKD) [1], demon-
strate quantum teleportation [2] and realize quantum re-
peaters [3]. Many methods have been exploited for veri-
fying entanglement. For example, one can apply the pos-
itive partial-transpose (PPT) criterion [4, 5], construct
symmetric extensions of a quantum state [6], or build
expectation-values matrices (EVMs) from experimental
observations and apply corresponding entanglement cri-
teria [7–11]. Also, one can verify entanglement by di-
rectly measuring special observables, e.g., Bell inequali-
ties [12] or entanglement witnesses [13, 14]. (See the re-
view paper [15] for a list and discussions of various meth-
ods.) For the typical QKD scenarios where Alice sends
optical signals to Bob, we can model the underlying quan-
tum state as Alice holding a discrete finite-dimensional
system while Bob receiving an infinite-dimensional opti-
cal mode. In this case, EVM-based verification meth-
ods are particularly useful. They have been well de-
veloped [8, 10, 11, 16–18] and applied to real experi-
ments [19, 20].
Almost all previously known methods for verifying en-
tanglement assume that various threshold detectors in-
volved in an experimental setup are ideal with perfect
efficiency [35]. This assumption can be justified when
there is no efficiency mismatch between these thresh-
old detectors. In this case, one cannot distinguish no-
detection events due to detection inefficiency from those
due to transmission loss. For simplicity of analysis, one
can lump these two kinds of loss together as a new in-
creased transmission loss followed by ideal threshold de-
tectors with perfect efficiency (see Sect. III C for detailed
discussions about this treatment). Then, one can ver-
ify entanglement and further prove the security of the
corresponding QKD protocols.
However, in practice it is hard to build two detectors
that have exactly the same efficiency (for example, due
to different samples of the fabrication process). In the
presence of efficiency mismatch, one cannot treat detec-
tion inefficiency in the same way as transmission loss,
and so previously known methods cannot be applied for
entanglement verification.
A detection-efficiency mismatch can also be induced by
an adversary using the fact that a detector can respond
to a photon differently depending on degrees of freedom
(for example, spatial mode, frequency, or arriving time)
rather than those employed to encode information. If an
adversary can control these degrees of freedom such that
the induced efficiency mismatch is large enough, power-
ful attacks on QKD systems exist, as demonstrated in
Refs. [21] and [22]. In typical experiments the efficiency
mismatch may not seem significant, but it still means
that the device cannot be covered by an existing security
proof.
In this paper we develop a general method to verify
entanglement in the presence of detection-efficiency mis-
match. The method works as long as the efficiency mis-
match is characterized, even if the mismatch depends on
degrees of freedom of a photon that are not employed to
encode information. We carefully study an implementa-
tion of the BB84-QKD prepare-and-measure protocol [23]
with polarization encoding, where we take account of the
fact that Bob receives signals in the infinite-dimensional
mode space with no limit on the number of photons con-
tained in that space. Our method is expected to work
for other QKD protocols. The full security proof of QKD
protocols with efficiency mismatch is still an open prob-
lem and is not addressed in the current paper either,
though some essential tools developed here will carry over
to such a security proof. Note that Ref. [24] studied the
security proof of the BB84-QKD protocol with efficiency
mismatch, under the additional assumption that Bob’s
system is a photonic qubit. However, this assumption is
hard to justify in actual implementations of QKD where
threshold detectors are being used.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows:
In Sect. II, we describe an experimental setup for im-
plementing the BB84-QKD protocol and the efficiency-
mismatch models considered. In Sect. III, we outline how
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2our method works and explain details on how to apply the
method to the particular experimental setup considered.
In Sect. IV, we simulate experimental results according
to a toy channel connecting Alice and Bob just for illus-
tration purposes. For this toy channel, we present the
bound on the efficiency mismatch in order for Alice and
Bob to verify entanglement based only on their observa-
tions. Finally we conclude the paper in Sect. V.
II. Experimental configuration
For simplicity, in this paper we consider an experi-
mental implementation of the BB84-QKD prepare-and-
measure protocol [23] with polarization encoding. In each
run of the protocol, Alice prepares an optical signal where
all the photons have the same polarization, randomly
selected from the horizontal (H), vertical (V ), diago-
nal (D), or anti-diagonal (A) polarizations. Then, Alice
sends the optical signal to Bob, and Bob randomly selects
to measure it either in the horizontal/vertical (H/V )
basis or the diagonal/anti-diagonal (D/A) basis. After
many runs of the protocol, if the final measurement re-
sults satisfy some conditions (for example, the quantum
bit error rate is low enough), Alice and Bob can distill
secret keys via some classical post-processing procedure.
For the present study of entanglement verification, we
only need to consider the quantum phase of the protocol,
i.e., the above prepare-and-measure step.
Obviously, in the above implementation there is no en-
tangled state physically shared between Alice and Bob.
However, there is another equivalent description, i.e., the
source-replacement description [1, 25], of the prepare-
and-measure step in a general QKD protocol: In this
thought setup, first Alice prepares an entangled state
|Φ〉AA′ =
S∑
s=1
√
ps |s〉A |φs〉A′ , (1)
where {|s〉A} is a set of orthogonal states and ps is
the probability of preparing the signal state |φs〉, s =
1, 2, ..., S. Second, Alice measures the system A with
the projective positive-operator valued measure (POVM)
{|s〉 〈s| , s = 1, 2, ..., S}, and distributes the correspond-
ing signal state |φs〉 to Bob. After the action of the
channel (or Eve) on system A′, Bob receives a system
B on which Bob performs a measurement. There is no
way for Eve or any other party outside of Alice’s lab
to tell which description, either the prepare-and-measure
or source-replacement description, is implemented at Al-
ice’s side. In the source-replacement description entan-
glement between Alice’s system A and Bob’s system B
(before their respective measurement) is required; other-
wise, intercept-resend attacks on the QKD system exist.
In this sense, we say that effective entanglement is a nec-
essary condition for secure QKD [1].
To measure the polarization state of the incoming op-
tical signal, Bob can employ either the active- or passive-
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FIG. 1: Schematic of the measurement device: (a) is the
active-detection scheme where a polarization rotator is used
to select a measurement basis, and (b) is the passive-detection
scheme where a 50/50 beam splitter is used to select a mea-
surement basis. Under each basis, a polarizing beam splitter
and two threshold detectors (which cannot distinguish the
number of incoming photons) are used to measure the polar-
ization state of an incoming optical signal. Each detector is
labelled by the corresponding measurement outcome.
detection scheme, as described in Fig. 1. The detectors
involved in each detection scheme are threshold detec-
tors which cannot distinguish the number of incoming
photons. So, each detector has only two outcomes, click
or no click. However, we do not restrict the number of
photons arriving at each detector, due to the following
two considerations: First, in practice information is usu-
ally encoded in coherent states which actually do have
multi-photon components; second, the optical signal pre-
pared by Alice can be intercepted by Eve and replaced
by another stronger signal during the transmission from
Alice to Bob.
In practice, the efficiencies of each detector are not
exactly the same. For the active-detection scheme as
shown in Fig. 1(a), the detection efficiency is denoted
by ηH/D if the measurement outcome is H or D, and
the efficiency is denoted by ηV/A if the outcome is V or
A. Similarly, for the passive-detection scheme as shown
in Fig. 1(b), there are four detectors corresponding to
the four measurement outcomes H, V , D and A. De-
note their respective efficiencies by ηH , ηV , ηD and ηA.
We will study entanglement verification in the presence
of efficiency mismatch between these detectors. We call
this the spatial-mode-independent mismatch model, in
contrast to the following mismatch model where the mis-
match depends additionally on the spatial modes.
The detection efficiency might not only be different
between different detectors of the same build, but there
might be also different coupling efficiencies of the detec-
tors to the observed light. This has been demonstrated in
recent works [26] and [27], where it has been shown that
the coupling efficiency of each detector can be tuned to
some degree independently by manipulating the spatial
modes of the incoming optical signals. As this kind of
spatial-mode-dependent efficiency mismatch is quite rel-
evant especially to implementations of free-space QKD,
we would like to study the effect of this mismatch model
on entanglement verification. In principle, the number
3TABLE I: Spatial-mode-dependent mismatch model in the
active-detection scheme, where 0 ≤ η ≤ 1. Different columns
are for different detectors labelled and shown in Fig. 1(a).
Different rows are mismatched efficiencies for different spatial
modes.
Det. ‘H/D’ Det. ‘V/A’
Mode 1 1 η
Mode 2 η 1
TABLE II: Spatial-mode-dependent mismatch model in the
passive-detection scheme, where 0 ≤ η ≤ 1. Different columns
are for different detectors labelled and shown in Fig. 1(b).
Different rows are mismatched efficiencies for different spatial
modes.
Det. ‘H’ Det. ‘V ’ Det. ‘D’ Det. ‘A’
Mode 1 1 η η η
Mode 2 η 1 η η
Mode 3 η η 1 η
Mode 4 η η η 1
of spatial modes of incoming optical signals can be ar-
bitrary, even infinite. Intuitively, when the number of
spatial modes is equal to or larger than the number of
detectors in the measurement device, it might become
possible for Eve to completely control Bob through the
efficiency mismatch. For example, if each detector re-
sponds to an optical signal only in a particular spatial
mode and different detectors respond to different spa-
tial modes, then Eve can completely effectively switch
on and off each detector by sending optical signals in
these particular spatial modes. To illustrate the effect of
spatial-mode-dependent efficiency mismatch on entangle-
ment verification, we consider the case where the num-
ber of spatial modes is equal to the number of detectors.
For illustration purposes, we also constrain the mismatch
model so that mismatched efficiencies have a permuta-
tion symmetry over spatial modes. In particular, the
mismatch models considered in the active- and passive-
detection schemes are shown as in Tables I and II, respec-
tively. According to the discussion in Sect. III C, we can
renormalize detection efficiencies and treat the common
loss in detectors as a part of transmission loss. Hence,
we set the maximum detection efficiency in Tables I or II
to be 1. We would like to stress that we consider these
mismatch models just for simplicity and ease of graphi-
cal illustrations: The method detailed in the next section
works for general mismatch models.
III. Our method
The main idea behind our method is to construct an
expectation-values matrix (EVM) [8, 10, 11, 16–18] using
a finite number of actual measurement operators which
contain efficiency-mismatch information. Let us discuss
the construction and general properties of an EVM before
moving on to our particular case.
Suppose that the joint system of Alice and Bob is de-
scribed by a state ρAB , and that there are two sets of
operators {Aˆi} and {Bˆj} acting on Alice’s and Bob’s
subsystems, respectively. Then, the entries of an EVM
χ(ρAB) are defined [36] as
[χ(ρAB)]ij,kl = Tr(ρABAˆ
†
i Aˆk ⊗ Bˆ†j Bˆl). (2)
By the definition, several properties are satisfied by
an EVM: First, an EVM is Hermitian and positive-
semidefinite. Second, if both the sets of operators {Aˆi}
and {Bˆj} are finite, the dimension of the EVM χ(ρAB) is
finite even though the state ρAB is infinite-dimensional.
Third, entries of an EVM can be expectation values of
observables, if the corresponding measurement operators
are included in the set {Aˆ†i Aˆk ⊗ Bˆ†j Bˆl}. Hence, an EVM
will be designed as an object into which we can enter all
experimental observations (i.e., the probabilities of Al-
ice’s and Bob’s joint measurement outcomes), but there
may be undetermined entries. Still, we can study vari-
ous properties, such as entanglement, of the underlying
state. Fourth, the linear relationships between various
operators Aˆ†i Aˆk ⊗ Bˆ†j Bˆl restrict the entries χij,kl. (Here
and later, we use χ and χij,kl as short notations of χ(ρAB)
and [χ(ρAB)]ij,kl if there is no confusion in the context.)
For example, if the operators satisfy∑
ijkl
Cij,klAˆ
†
i Aˆk ⊗ Bˆ†j Bˆl ≥ 0, (3)
then for any density matrix ρAB the entries of the corre-
sponding EVM satisfy∑
ijkl
Cij,klχij,kl ≥ 0, (4)
where the coefficients Cij,kl are complex numbers.
Eq. (4) can be proved using the positivity of the whole
operator in the left-hand side of Eq. (3) and the definition
of an EVM. We will exploit all the above properties to
reduce the number of free parameters in the constructed
EVM and so reduce the complexity of the entanglement-
verification problem.
Furthermore, to verify entanglement we need the fol-
lowing observation [10, 11]:
Observation 1. If the state ρAB is separable, then
χ(ρAB) has a separable structure and so satisfies the PPT
criterion.
This observation follows from the definition of an EVM
4and the PPT criterion [4, 5] satisfied by all separable (and
even un-normalized) states. Note that an EVM is a un-
normalized positive-semidefinite matrix. Thus, one can
prove that the underlying state ρAB must be entangled
by showing that the constructed EVM χ cannot simulta-
neously satisfy the following two constraints: First, the
entries χij,kl are consistent with experimental observa-
tions and also with operator relationships; second, χ ≥ 0
and χΓA ≥ 0 where ΓA is the partial-transpose opera-
tion on Alice’s system. Hence, entanglement verification
can be formulated as a semidefinite programming (SDP)
problem which can be solved efficiently (see Sect. III D
for details).
To construct an EVM useful for our situation, we need
to choose appropriate sets of operators {Aˆi} and {Bˆj}.
In the following subsections, we will discuss in detail the
set of operators that we consider in the case of efficiency
mismatch, and also lay out several tricks that we can
exploit to achieve our goal.
A. Operators exploited for the construction of
EVMs
Let us consider Alice’s side first. Recall that in the
source-replacement description of a QKD protocol Alice
first prepares the entangled state in Eq. (1) between sys-
tems A and A′. Subsequently, Alice measures the system
A and sends the corresponding signal state encoded in
system A′ to Bob. In the above process, the system A
remains at Alice. As a result, the reduced density matrix
ρA of system A does not change even if the signal states
change during the transmission from Alice to Bob. Also,
Alice has complete knowledge of ρA, since the state in
Eq. (1) is prepared and known by herself. Actually the
overlap structure of signal states {|φs〉 , s = 1, 2, ..., S}
and the probabilities of preparing different signal states
{ps, s = 1, 2, ..., S} determine the reduced state ρA. The
rank of the density matrix ρA can be less than S, if the
signal states prepared by Alice are linearly dependent.
For example, in the ideal BB84-QKD protocol where in-
formation is encoded in the polarization of a single pho-
ton, the entangled state prepared by Alice is
|Ψ〉AA′ =
1
2
(|1〉A |H〉A′ + |2〉A |V 〉A′
+ |3〉A |D〉A′ + |4〉A |A〉A′), (5)
where |H〉 , |V 〉 , |D〉, and |A〉 are single-photon states
with horizontal, vertical, diagonal, and anti-diagonal po-
larizations, respectively. Although the reduced density
matrix ρA is of dimension 4×4, it is easy to check that ρA
lives in a 2-dimensional subspace and that Alice’s mea-
surement {|1〉 〈1| , |2〉 〈2| , |3〉 〈3| , |4〉 〈4|} also has a repre-
sentation in the same 2-dimensional subspace.
To take advantage of the complete knowledge of Alice’s
state ρA and her measurement, we set the operators at
Alice’s side to be Aˆi = |φ〉 〈i| with i = 1, 2, ..., n, where
the pure states {|i〉 , i = 1, 2, ..., n} form a basis for the
support of the density matrix ρA and |φ〉 is an arbitrary
pure state of Alice’s system. By choosing these operators,
we can make sure that Alice’s state and observations (i.e.,
the probabilities of Alice’s measurement results) all are
included in the constructed EVM (if the set of operators
considered at Bob’s side contains the identity operator,
which is usually a good choice).
Now, let us proceed to Bob’s side. Depending on which
detection scheme in Fig. 1 is used and which mismatch
model is considered, the set of operators exploited is dif-
ferent. In the following subsection, we will discuss the
operators exploited in the active-detection scheme with
one spatial mode (i.e., the spatial-mode-independent sce-
nario). The operators exploited in the other cases are
postponed to Appendix 1 due to their complexities.
1. A basic construction of EVMs
In the active-detection scheme as shown in Fig. 1(a),
the four possible events in a measurement basis are click
at only one of the two detectors (single click), clicks at
both detectors (double click), and no click at neither of
the two detectors. Suppose that the two detectors in
Fig. 1(a) have efficiencies ηH/D and ηV/A, respectively.
Then, the POVM elements for both the H/V and D/A
measurement choices can be written down explicitly. For
example, the POVM elements for the measurement in
the H/V basis are
MH =
∞∑
nH=1
∞∑
nV =0
(
1− (1− ηH/D)nH
)
(1− ηV/A)nV
|nH , nV 〉 〈nH , nV | ,
MV =
∞∑
nH=0
∞∑
nV =1
(1− ηH/D)nH
(
1− (1− ηV/A)nV
)
|nH , nV 〉 〈nH , nV | ,
MHV =
∞∑
nH=1
∞∑
nV =1
(
1− (1− ηH/D)nH
) (
1− (1− ηV/A)nV
)
|nH , nV 〉 〈nH , nV | , and
M+∅ =
∞∑
nH=0
∞∑
nV =0
(1− ηH/D)nH (1− ηV/A)nV
|nH , nV 〉 〈nH , nV | . (6)
Here, the subscripts of the POVM elements indicate the
corresponding click events, the notation ‘∅’ means no
click, the superscript ‘+’ denotes the H/V measurement
basis, and |nH , nV 〉 is a photon-number basis state con-
taining nH horizontally polarized photons and nV verti-
cally polarized photons. See Appendix 2 for the deriva-
tion of the POVM elements in Eq. (6).
The POVM elements in Eq. (6) satisfy two prop-
erties. First, it is obvious to see that these POVM
5elements are diagonal in the photon-number basis
{|nH , nV 〉 , nH , nV = 0, 1, 2, ...}. Hence, any two of
them commute. Second, because ηH/D and ηV/A are
between 0 and 1, so are all coefficients of the terms
|nH , nV 〉 〈nH , nV | in Eq. (6). Hence, we get the following
relationships:
Mi ≥MiMj ≥ 0, (7)
where i, j = H,V , or HV . Here, we write down A ≥ B
when (A − B) is a positive-semidefinite matrix. Using
these two properties, we can restrict the entries of the
constructed EVM if the measurement POVM elements
in Eq. (6) are exploited.
The above two properties are also satisfied by the
POVM elements for the measurement in the D/A ba-
sis. These POVM elements have the same expressions as
those in Eq. (6) with the replacement of the subscripts
H and V by D and A, respectively. For example, the
POVM element for the single-click event with diagonal
polarization is
MD =
∞∑
nD=1
∞∑
nA=0
(
1− (1− ηH/D)nD
)
(1− ηV/A)nA
|nD, nA〉 〈nD, nA| , (8)
where the basis state |nD, nA〉 contains nD diagonally
polarized photons and nA anti-diagonally polarized pho-
tons. The expressions of the other three POVM elements
MA,MDA and M
×
∅ , where the superscript ‘×’ indicates
the D/A basis, can be found in Appendix 2.
The expectation values of the POVM elements for mea-
surements in both the H/V and D/A bases are experi-
mental observations. Therefore, in the construction of
an EVM we can utilize these POVM elements. Since
MH +MV +MHV +M
+
∅ = MD +MA+MDA+M
×
∅ = I,
where I is the identity operator in the full state space,
these POVM elements are not linearly independent. To
construct an EVM, we will use the linearly independent
operators in the following set:
S ≡ {I,MH ,MV ,MHV ,MD,MA,MDA}. (9)
Using the EVM constructed with the operators in the
above set S, we can verify entanglement when the ob-
served error probability and observed double-click prob-
ability are low enough. To illustrate this result, in
Sect. IV A we will study a particular channel connect-
ing Alice and Bob. Then, it turns out that entanglement
can be verified when the depolarizing probability ω and
the multi-photon probability p in the channel are low
enough, as we will later see in Fig. 8.
2. An improved construction of EVMs
To improve the results, we consider projections of the
operators in the set S onto various photon-number sub-
spaces. There are two reasons for exploiting these pro-
jections in the construction of an EVM: First, more op-
erator relationships between these projections can be ex-
ploited. Second, as shown later, the expectation values
of these projections can be bounded from experimental
observations. Both of these help to constrain the con-
structed EVM. Generally speaking, the higher the num-
ber of considered photon-number subspaces, the stronger
the entanglement-verification power of our method be-
comes. However, with the increase of the number of con-
sidered photon-number subspaces the complexity of the
resulting SDP problem increases.
For implementation simplicity, we consider the projec-
tions of operators onto the zero-photon, one-photon, and
two-photons subspaces. The projections of the identity
operator I onto those subspaces are denoted by I1×1,
I2×2 and I3×3, respectively, where Id×d is the identity
matrix of dimension d × d. For the other operators in
the set S, from their explicit expressions (e.g., Eqs. (6)
and (8)) we can see that their projections onto a photon-
number subspace are linear combinations of ideal opera-
tors in the same subspace, where the combination coeffi-
cients depend on mismatched efficiencies. Here, the ideal
operators are the projections of measurement POVM el-
ements as setting all detection efficiencies to be perfect;
these ideal operators will be denoted by notations with
tildes in order to be distinguished from real operators.
For example, the projection of MH in Eq. (6) onto the
(≤ 2)-photons subspace M (≤2)H is
M
(≤2)
H =ηH/D(1− ηV/A)(I3×3 − M˜ (2)H − M˜ (2)V )
+ (1− (1− ηH/D)2)M˜ (2)H + ηH/DM˜ (1)H , (10)
where the superscript ‘(1)’ or ‘(2)’ means restriction to
the one-photon or two-photons subspace. To write down
all the projections, we need the following set of ideal op-
erators:
{I1×1, I2×2, I3×3, M˜ (1)H , M˜ (1)D , M˜ (2)H , M˜ (2)V , M˜ (2)D , M˜ (2)A }.
(11)
Note that we do not need the ideal operators
M˜
(1)
V , M˜
(1)
A , M˜
(2)
HV and M˜
(2)
DA, due to the linear depen-
dences M˜
(1)
H + M˜
(1)
V = M˜
(1)
D + M˜
(1)
A = I2×2 and M˜
(2)
H +
M˜
(2)
HV + M˜
(2)
V = M˜
(2)
D + M˜
(2)
DA + M˜
(2)
A = I3×3. Instead of
the projections onto the (≤ 2)-photons subspace, we will
use the ideal operators in Eq. (11) to construct an EVM,
since the relationships between these ideal operators, as
studied in Appendix 3, are simpler.
Moreover, there are relations between the ideal op-
erators in Eq. (11) and measurement POVM elements.
For example, because the POVM element MH is block-
diagonal with respect to various photon-number sub-
spaces, we have that
MH ≥M (≤2)H . (12)
Then, considering Eq. (10), we can relate a linear combi-
6nation of ideal operators in Eq. (11) to the measurement
POVM element MH by an inequality. Similar relations
apply to other POVM elements. As a result, we can
bound the expectation values of the ideal operators in
Eq. (11) based on experimental observations. Therefore,
to construct an EVM, in addition to the measurement
operators in the set defined in Eq. (9) we can take ad-
vantage of the ideal operators in the following sets:
S0 ≡{|Vac〉 〈Vac|}, (13)
S1 ≡{I2×2, M˜ (1)H , M˜ (1)D , σy}, and (14)
S2 ≡{I3×3, M˜ (2)H , M˜ (2)V , M˜ (2)D , M˜ (2)A , Sy}. (15)
Here, |Vac〉 〈Vac| is the projection onto the vacuum state
|Vac〉 (i.e., the zero-photon subspace), and the set S1 or
S2 contains ideal operators in the one-photon or two-
photons subspace, respectively. We include the qubit
Pauli operator σy and the spin-1 operator Sy in the above
sets, because they are involved in the commutation re-
lationships between ideal operators (see Appendix 3).
Note that any two operators from any two different sets
as above are orthogonal to each other.
B. Bounds on the number of photons arriving at
Bob
In the previous subsection, we discussed several sets
of ideal operators exploited for constructing an EVM.
From experimental observations, we can bound expecta-
tion values of these ideal operators. Strictly speaking,
we can bound their expectation values only from above
(see Eq. (12) for an example). These upper-bound con-
straints can be satisfied in a trivial way, if the state does
not lie in the same Hilbert space as the ideal operators
exploited and so all expectation values of these ideal op-
erators are zero. As a consequence, the relationships be-
tween these operators would not be helpful. Since we
would like to exploit the operators particularly in the
zero-photon, one-photon, or two-photons subspaces, we
need to bound from below the probabilities that the state
lies in these subspaces. In order to achieve this goal, we
introduce additional constraints outside of the EVM for-
malism.
1. Active-detection case
For the active-detection scheme we consider the follow-
ing intuition: With the increase of the number of pho-
tons n arriving at Bob, the double-click probability (or
the effective-error probability as defined below) condi-
tional on the photon number n will increase and finally
surpass the observed double-click probability (or the ob-
served effective-error probability). Hence, in order to be
consistent with experimental observations, the probabil-
ity of a large number of photons arriving at Bob must be
small. This motivates us to exploit the following double-
click operator
FDC =
1
2
IA ⊗MBHV +
1
2
IA ⊗MBDA, (16)
and the effective-error operator
FEE =
1
2
MAH ⊗ (MBV +
1
2
MBHV ) +
1
2
MAV ⊗ (MBH +
1
2
MBHV )
+
1
2
MAD ⊗ (MBA +
1
2
MBDA) +
1
2
MAA ⊗ (MBD +
1
2
MBDA),
(17)
where the superscripts ‘A’ and ‘B’ denote Alice and Bob.
The coefficient 1/2 before each term is due to the proba-
bility 1/2 of selecting the H/V or D/A measurement ba-
sis. According to the source-replacement description [25],
Alice’s measurement operators MAH , M
A
V , M
A
D and M
A
A
are ideal measurement operators in the one-photon sub-
space. Bob’s measurement operators are as discussed
in Sect. III A and Appendix 1 a. Note that the defini-
tion of the above effective-error operator is motivated
by the post-processing rule typically used in squashing
models [28, 29], where one uniformly randomly assigns a
double-click event to one of the two single-click events at
the same basis.
Before explaining how to utilize the operators FDC and
FEE , let us discuss two properties of the state ρAB shared
between Alice and Bob in the thought setup according to
the source-replacement description. First, because mea-
surement POVMs at Bob are block-diagonal with respect
to various photon-number subspaces across all modes in-
volved, we can assume without loss of generality that the
state ρAB has the same block-diagonal structure. That
is, ρAB can be written as
ρAB =
∞⊕
n=0
pnρ
(n)
AB . (18)
Here, pn is the probability that the state ρAB lies in the
n-photons subspace across all modes involved, and ρ
(n)
AB
is the normalized state conditional on n photons arriving
at Bob. Second, we can assume without loss of general-
ity that ρAB and ρ
(n)
AB are real-valued. This is because
all measurement POVM elements MAx and M
B
y of Al-
ice and Bob can be represented by real-valued matrices
in the photon-number basis (see Ref. [8] for a detailed
argument). The above two properties apply to the state
ρAB under either the active- or passive-detection scheme.
Considering the second property, we can reduce the num-
ber of free parameters in the constructed EVM and in the
following optimization problems.
Now, let us proceed to formalize our intuition that the
double-click probability (or the effective-error probabil-
ity) conditional on the number of photons arriving at
Bob increases with the photon number n. We study the
7following optimization problems:
dn,min = minρ(n)AB
dn
subject to ρ
(n)
AB ≥ 0
Tr
(
ρ
(n)
AB
)
= 1(
ρ
(n)
AB
)ΓA ≥ 0
(19)
and
en,min = minρ(n)AB
en
subject to ρ
(n)
AB ≥ 0
Tr
(
ρ
(n)
AB
)
= 1(
ρ
(n)
AB
)ΓA ≥ 0,
(20)
where the objective functions of the above two optimiza-
tion problems are given by dn = Tr
(
ρ
(n)
ABF
(n)
DC
)
and
en = Tr
(
ρ
(n)
ABF
(n)
EE
)
, respectively. The operators F
(n)
DC
and F
(n)
EE are projections of the double-click operator FDC
and the effective-error operator FEE onto the n-photons
subspace of Bob. Note that in the above optimization
problems we constrain the n-photons state ρ
(n)
AB such that
its partial transpose
(
ρ
(n)
AB
)ΓA
is positive-semidefinite.
The reason is as follows: In order to verify entanglement
we need to check whether or not there is a separable
state consistent with experimental observations. Consid-
ering the block-diagonal structure of the state ρAB , if
ρAB is separable then its projection onto any n-photons
subspace ρ
(n)
AB must be separable and so satisfy the PPT
criterion.
The optimization problems in Eqs. (19) and (20) are
SDPs. We solved them numerically using the toolbox
YALMIP [30] of MATLAB. We observed that with the
increase of the photon number n, both of the mini-
mum double-click probability dn,min and the minimum
effective-error probability en,min monotonically increase
and converge under an arbitrary mismatch model. (We
have not proved this analytically, but numerical evidence
strongly suggests that our observation is true.) The opti-
mization results for the mismatch model specified in Ta-
ble I are shown in Figs. 2 and 3. As a consequence, given
the observed double-click probability dobs and observed
effective-error probability eobs, we get that
dobs =
∞∑
n=0
pndn ≥ p2d2 + (1− p0 − p1 − p2)d3,min,
(21)
and
eobs =
∞∑
n=0
pnen ≥ p1e1 + p2e2 + (1− p0 − p1 − p2)e3,min,
(22)
if the state ρAB is separable. Here, we use the facts that∑∞
n=0 pn = 1 and d0 = d1 = e0 = 0. From the above
two inequalities, obviously we get that dobs ≥ (1 − p0 −
p1−p2)d3,min and eobs ≥ (1−p0−p1−p2)e3,min. Hence,
we can bound from below the sum of the probabilities of
zero photon, one photon and two photons (p0 + p1 + p2).
Note that the parameters p0, p1, p2, d2, e1, and e2 can
be written as linear combinations of the EVM entries,
when the EVM is constructed with ideal operators in the
(≤ 2)-photons subspace (as we implemented).
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FIG. 2: The minimum double-click probability dn,min as a
function of the number of photons n arriving at Bob in the
active-detection scheme. The results for the mismatch model
specified in Table I are shown.
1 5 10 15 20
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
n
e n
,m
in
 
 
η = 0.6
η = 0.4
η = 0.8
η = 1
η = 0.2
FIG. 3: The minimum effective-error probability en,min as a
function of the number of photons n arriving at Bob in the
active-detection scheme. The results for the mismatch model
specified in Table I are shown.
2. Passive-detection case
In the passive-detection scheme as shown in Fig. 1(b),
a 50/50 beam splitter is used for selecting different mea-
surement bases. So, the probability that n incoming pho-
tons leave the beam splitter at different output arms is
1 − 2−(n−1), which increases with the photon number
n. These photons will potentially contribute to clicks at
8two or more detectors at different output arms of the
beam splitter, to which we refer as cross-click events.
So, we expect that with the increase of n the cross-click
probability conditional on n increases and converges to
one. (In contrast, neither the double-click probability
nor the effective-error probability increases with n, since
the probability that n incoming photons leave the beam
splitter at the same output arm decreases with n.) The
above expectation motivates us to consider the following
cross-click operator:
FCC = I
A ⊗MBCC , (23)
where MCC is the POVM element for cross-click events
at Bob (see Appendix 2 for details of the measurement
POVM elements in the passive-detection scheme). Our
expectation can be formalized as investigating the follow-
ing optimization problem:
cn,min = minρ(n)AB
cn
subject to ρ
(n)
AB ≥ 0
Tr
(
ρ
(n)
AB
)
= 1(
ρ
(n)
AB
)ΓA ≥ 0,
(24)
where the objective function is given by cn =
Tr
(
ρ
(n)
ABF
(n)
CC
)
, and F
(n)
CC is the projection of the cross-
click operator FCC onto the n-photons subspace of Bob.
The same as in the active-detection case, we constrain
the n-photons state ρ
(n)
AB such that it satisfies the PPT
criterion.
The above optimization problem is a SDP, which can
be solved numerically using the toolbox YALMIP [30]
of MATLAB. Strong numerical evidence suggests that
with the increase of n the minimum cross-click probabil-
ity cn,min monotonically increases and converges to one
under an arbitrary mismatch model. For the mismatch
model specified in Table II, the optimization results are
shown in Fig. 4. As a result, given the observed cross-
click probability cobs, we have that
cobs =
∞∑
n=0
pncn =
∞∑
n=2
pncn ≥ (1− p0 − p1) c2,min. (25)
Here, we use the facts that
∑∞
n=0 pn = 1 and c0 = c1 = 0.
Thus we can bound from below the probability of no more
than one photon arriving at Bob.
In the end, we would like to make a comment on the ef-
fect of the detection-efficiency mismatch. From Figs. 2, 3
and 4, one can see that, given the photon number n, the
larger the efficiency mismatch (i.e., the smaller the pa-
rameter η), the smaller the minimum probability of in-
duced double-click events, effective-error events, or cross-
click events becomes. In this sense, we expect that the
efficiency mismatch helps Eve to attack the QKD system.
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FIG. 4: The minimum cross-click probability cn,min as a func-
tion of the number of photons n arriving at Bob in the passive-
detection scheme. The results for the mismatch model speci-
fied in Table II are shown.
C. Efficiency renormalization
The relative efficiencies of different detectors in Fig. 1
can be those described in Tables I and II. However, in
practice no detector has an absolute efficiency 1. Suppose
that the efficiencies of the two detectors in the active-
detection scheme of Fig. 1(a) can be written as η0η1 and
η0η2 respectively, where 0 ≤ η0, η1, η2 ≤ 1. Then, there
are two equivalent descriptions of the same measurement
device, as shown in Fig. 5. According to the description
in Fig. 5(b), we can lump together the common loss η0
in the two detectors and the transmission loss in order
to verify entanglement. The reason is as follows: Once
entanglement is verified in the state shared between Alice
and Bob after passing the beam splitter in Fig. 5(b),
then the state before entering the whole measurement
device in Fig. 5(a) must be entangled (otherwise, there
is contradiction).
According to Fig. 5(b), the detection efficiencies ηH/D
and ηV/A in measurement POVM elements, such as those
in Eqs. (6) and (8), are rescaled by a factor 1/η0. As we
observed, given the photon number n arriving at Bob,
with the increase of these detection efficiencies both the
minimum double-click probability dn,min and the mini-
mum effective-error probability en,min increase. Hence,
given experimental observations, by rescaling detection
efficiencies the expectation values of ideal operators in
the (≤ 2)-photons subspace can be bounded more tightly.
We observed that more entangled states can be verified
in this way than according to the description in Fig. 5(a).
Therefore, in implementations of our method we renor-
malize detection efficiencies so that the maximum rela-
tive efficiency is 1. The same trick can be applied to the
passive-detection scheme, as shown in Fig. 6. Note that
the renormalization trick can also be applied to the case
with multiple spatial modes. But, for this general case
we need to renormalize the efficiencies over all detectors
and over all spatial modes at the same time.
9In a nutshell, our numerical observations show that
if we renormalize detection efficiencies so that the max-
imum relative efficiency over all detectors and over all
spatial modes is 1, then we can verify more entangled
states than according to the actual description of the
measurement device.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PBS PR 
PR PBS 
𝜂0𝜂2 
𝜂0𝜂1 
𝜂1 
𝜂2 
BS 
(a) 
(b) 
PR PBS 
𝜂2 
𝜂1 
(b) 
√𝜂0 
PR – Polarization Rotator  PBS – Polarizing Beam Splitter  BS – Beam Splitter 
 
FIG. 5: Two equivalent descriptions of the same measure-
ment device in the active-detection scheme, where the de-
tection efficiency is written down around each detector and
0 ≤ η0, η1, η2 ≤ 1: (a) is the actual situation, and (b) is the
hypothetical situation where the common loss η0 in the two
detectors is factored out and treated as a part of transmission
loss. The beam splitter in (b) has a transmission coefficient√
η0. See Appendix 4 for a proof of this equivalence.
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FIG. 6: Two equivalent descriptions of the same measure-
ment device in the passive-detection scheme, where the de-
tection efficiency is written down around each detector and
0 ≤ η0, η1, η2, η3, η4 ≤ 1: (a) is the actual situation, and (b)
is the hypothetical situation where the common loss η0 in the
four detectors is factored out and treated as a part of trans-
mission loss. The first beam splitter in (b) has a transmission
coefficient
√
η0. See Appendix 5 for a proof of this equiva-
lence.
D. SDP for entanglement verification
According to Observation 1, we can formulate entan-
glement verification as a SDP problem. Specifically, we
need to solve a SDP feasibility problem of the form
find χ
subject to χ ≥ 0 and χΓA ≥ 0∑
ijkl C
(n)
ij,klχij,kl = 0, n = 1, 2, ..., N∑
ijkl C
(m)
ij,klχij,kl ≥ 0,m = N + 1, 2, ..., N +M.
(26)
Here, the matrix χ is an EVM, the coefficients C
(n)
ij,kl with
n = 1, 2, ..., N +M are complex numbers, and N and M
are the numbers of equality and inequality constraints
respectively. The equality constraints can be according
to experimental observations and commutation relation-
ships between operators (such as those in Eq. (56) of
Appendix 3). The inequality constraints can be derived
from operator relationships, such as those in Eqs. (7)
and (12), or ased on the inequalities in Eqs. (21), (22),
and (25). If the SDP problem in Eq. (26) is not feasi-
ble, then the underlying state shared by Alice and Bob
must be entangled. In our implementation, the opti-
mization problem in Eq. (26) is solved using the toolbox
YALMIP [30] of MATLAB. More details on the formula-
tion of the SDP problem can be found in Appendix 6.
IV. Demonstration with simulated results
The method discussed in Sect. III works for general
detection-efficiency mismatch models. To illustrate our
method, we consider particular mismatch models, such
as those specified in Tables I and II. In the absence of
a real experiment and for simplicity, we simulate exper-
imental results according to a toy model detailed in the
following subsection. We would like to stress that our
method for verifying entanglement depends only on ex-
perimental observations and measurement POVMs but
does not depend on the details of data simulation listed
below.
A. Data simulation
We consider the ideal BB84-QKD protocol. Alice first
prepares an entangled state as in Eq. (5) according to
the source-replacement description. Then Alice sends
out the polarized photon to Bob. We model the chan-
nel connecting Alice and Bob as a depolarizing channel
with depolarizing probability ω; additionally, the trans-
mission loss (i.e., the single-photon loss probability) over
the channel is r; and Eve intercepts the single photon and
resends multiple photons to Bob with probability p. The
multi-photon state resent by Eve is a randomly-polarized
n-photons state of the form
ρn =
1
2npi
∫ 2pi
0
dθ
(
aˆ†θ
)n
|0〉 〈0| (aˆθ)n . (27)
Here, aˆ†θ = cos(θ)aˆ
†
H+sin(θ)aˆ
†
V , and aˆ
†
H (or aˆ
†
V ) is the cre-
ation operator associated with the horizontally-polarized
(or vertically-polarized) optical mode. The number of
photons n resent will be specified later for each simu-
lation. Moreover, when there is more than one spatial
mode, the optical signal is distributed over these spa-
tial modes uniformly randomly. For measurements at
Bob, we consider both the active- and passive-detection
schemes, as shown in Fig. 1.
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B. No-mismatch case and comparison with
squashing models
When there is no efficiency mismatch between thresh-
old detectors involved in the measurement device, one
can verify entanglement based on squashing models [28,
29, 31, 32]. In this case, Bob uniformly randomly as-
signs a double-click event to one of the two single-click
events at the same measurement basis, and assigns all
cross-click events to no detection. Then, his observations
can be thought of as generated by a qutrit system (con-
stituted by a single photon and the vacuum). Once we
can verify that this qutrit system is entangled with Al-
ice’s system, then the original system shared by Alice and
Bob must be entangled [28, 31]. Note that it is still an
open question whether or not a squashing model exists
in the case of efficiency mismatch.
We compare our method with the one based on squash-
ing models when there is no efficiency mismatch. For
this purpose, we simulate experimental results according
to the toy model specified in Sec. IV A. Particularly, we
consider the case with no transmission loss. The com-
parison shows different behaviour, depending on the ob-
servations of Alice and Bob. To demonstrate the advan-
tage of our method, we consider the case that the multi-
photon state resent by Eve is of the form as in Eq. (27)
with n = 2. (Note that the advantage of our method
reduces with the increase of n and finally disappears.)
To construct an EVM, we use both the measurement
POVM elements (Eq. (9) for the active-detection scheme
or Eq. (35) in Appendix 1 b for the passive-detection
scheme) and the ideal operators in the (≤ 2)-photons
subspace (Eqs. (13), (14) and (15)). The results in Fig. 7
demonstrate the advantage of our method for entangle-
ment verification in the passive-detection scheme. This
could be understood as follows: According to the squash-
ing model we discard cross-click events, whereas in our
method we take advantage of them in order to bound
the number of photons arriving at Bob (see Eq. (25)).
Fig. 7 also shows that when there is no mismatch the
passive-detection scheme is better for verifying entan-
glement than the active-detection scheme. This is be-
cause the probability of detecting multi-photon events
in the passive-detection scheme is higher than that in
the active-detection scheme, given the same incoming
multi-photon state. So, in the passive-detection scheme
our method can take more advantage of operators in the
(≤ 2)-photons subspace.
We also observe that it is useful to consider oper-
ators in various photon-number subspaces, as demon-
strated in Fig. 8. In general, the higher the number
of considered photon-number subspaces, the stronger
the entanglement-verification power of our method be-
comes. But, with the increase of the number of con-
sidered photon-number subspaces the complexity of the
resulting SDP problem increases.
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FIG. 7: Comparison of our method with the one based on
squashing models when there is no efficiency mismatch and no
transmission loss. Here, ω is the depolarizing probability and
p is the multi-photon probability in the channel. Below the
curves entanglement can be verified. For the active-detection
scheme, the results according to our method or based on the
squashing model coincide with each other, as shown by dia-
monds. For the passive-detection scheme, the results accord-
ing to our method are shown by circles, whereas the results
based on the squashing model are shown by squares.
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FIG. 8: Comparison of the results using EVMs constructed
with different numbers of operators in the active-detection
scheme. Here, ω is the depolarizing probability and p is the
multi-photon probability in the channel. Below the curves en-
tanglement can be verified. The circles show the results when
using only the measurement POVM elements (Eq. (9)) to con-
struct an EVM, whereas the squares show the results when us-
ing both the measurement POVM elements (Eq. (9)) and the
ideal operators in the (≤ 2)-photons subspace (Eqs. (13), (14)
and (15)) to construct an EVM. Here, we consider the case
with no efficiency mismatch and no transmission loss.
C. Spatial-mode-independent mismatch
Let us start by considering the simple case where the
efficiencies of various detectors involved can take differ-
ent values, but the efficiencies are equal for every spatial
mode. Without loss of generality, we assume that there
is only one spatial mode. To construct an EVM, we use
11
both the measurement POVM elements (Eq. (9) for the
active-detection scheme or Eq. (35) in Appendix 1 b for
the passive-detection scheme) and the ideal operators in
the (≤ 2)-photons subspace (Eqs. (13), (14) and (15)).
The results presented in this subsection are based on sim-
ulations according to the toy model specified in Sec. IV A.
For simplicity, we assume that the multi-photon state re-
sent by Eve is of the form as in Eq. (27) with n→∞.
First, we compare the abilities of verifying entangle-
ment of the two detection schemes in Fig. 1, when effi-
ciency mismatch is the same. Since there are two detec-
tors in the active-detection scheme, up to permutation
symmetry and efficiency renormalization as discussed in
Sect. III C, there is only one kind of mismatch model.
Hence, for the purpose of comparison, we consider the
case ηH/D = 1 and ηV/A = η < 1 in the active-detection
scheme, corresponding to the case ηH = ηD = 1 and
ηV = ηA = η < 1 in the passive-detection scheme. We
would like to find out the minimum efficiency ηmin (cor-
responding to the maximum mismatch) such that entan-
glement can be verified as long as η ≥ ηmin. This min-
imum efficiency ηmin characterizes the robustness of a
detection scheme against mismatch for verifying entan-
glement. Typical results are shown in Fig. 9, where we
fix the multi-photon probability p and the transmission
loss r, and characterize the minimum efficiency ηmin as a
function of the depolarizing probability ω. From Fig. 9,
one can see that the minimum efficiencies in the active-
and passive-detection schemes cross over with each other:
For most values of ω the active-detection scheme is better
than the passive-detection scheme in terms of robustness
against mismatch. However, there are regions for the
values of ω where the passive-detection scheme is better.
Fig. 9 also shows that our method works well even for
high-loss cases.
When there are no multi-photon events, i.e., p = 0,
our method can verify entanglement as long as the de-
polarizing probability satisfies ω < 1/2, regardless of the
values for the detection efficiency η and transmission loss
r. This is because when p = 0 our method can cer-
tify that there is no more than one photon arriving at
Bob. Then, given the observed probability distribution
and the mismatch model, the probability distribution for
the no-mismatch case can be inferred. In the case of
no mismatch, entanglement can be verified as long as the
quantum bit error rate is less than 25% [33], which corre-
sponds to the condition that the depolarizing probability
satisfies ω < 1/2.
Second, we study more general mismatch models in
the passive-detection scheme. In this scheme, the effi-
ciencies of the four detectors as shown in Fig. 1(b) can
take different values from each other. When fixing the
efficiencies of two of the four detectors, for example, ηH
and ηD, there is a trade-off between the efficiencies of
the other two detectors, ηV and ηA, in order to verify
entanglement, as shown in Fig. 10.
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FIG. 9: Minimum efficiency ηmin required for verifying en-
tanglement as a function of the depolarizing probability ω in
the channel. The circles, squares and diamonds show the re-
sults for the active-detection scheme with transmission losses
r = 0, 0.75 and 0.95, respectively. The crosses, pluses and
pentagrams show the results for the passive-detection scheme
with transmission losses r = 0, 0.75 and 0.95, respectively.
Here, we fix the multi-photon probability p = 0.01. We choose
the above values of r and p just for ease of graphical illustra-
tions.
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FIG. 10: Trade-off between efficiencies ηV and ηA under fixed
values for ηH and ηD in the passive-detection scheme. When
the point (ηV , ηA) is above the curve, entanglement can be
verified by our method. Here, we fix the depolarizing prob-
ability ω = 0.05, the multi-photon probability p = 0.01, and
the transmission loss r = 0.5. We choose these values just for
ease of graphical illustrations.
D. Spatial-mode-dependent mismatch
We now increase the number of spatial modes and con-
sider spatial-mode-dependent mismatch models, such as
those in Tables I and II. The results presented in this
subsection are based on simulations according to the toy
model specified in Sec. IV A. As in the previous subsec-
tion, we assume that the multi-photon state resent by
Eve is of the form as in Eq. (27) with n→∞.
First, let us study the mismatch model in Table I for
the active-detection scheme. As in the previous subsec-
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tion, we would like to find out the minimum efficiency
ηmin characterizing the robustness of a detection scheme
against mismatch for verifying entanglement. Here, we
use both measurement POVM elements and the ideal op-
erators in the (≤ 2)-photons subspace to construct an
EVM (see Appendix 1 a for details). When there is no
transmission loss, i.e., r = 0, the results are shown in
Fig. 11. From this figure, one can see that the higher the
depolarizing probability ω or the multi-photon probabil-
ity p, the larger the minimum efficiency ηmin becomes
for verifying entanglement. We also study the effect of
transmission loss on entanglement verification, as shown
in Fig. 12. From this figure, one can see that our method
works well even for high-loss cases. The results in Figs. 11
and 12 suggest that the larger the efficiency mismatch
(i.e., the smaller the efficiency η), the smaller the set of
noise parameters ω, p and r that preserve entanglement
becomes.
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FIG. 11: Minimum efficiency ηmin required for verifying en-
tanglement as a function of the depolarizing probability ω in
the channel without transmission loss. Different markers are
for different multi-photon probabilities p as labelled in the
plot. Here we consider the active-detection scheme. The mis-
match model studied is shown in Table I. We choose the above
values of p just for ease of graphical illustrations.
Second, we study the mismatch model in Table II for
the passive-detection scheme. Here, we use both mea-
surement POVM elements and the ideal operators in the
(≤ 1)-photon subspace to construct an EVM. Because of
the implementation complexity, we do not consider the
operators in the two-photons subspace (see Appendix 1 b
for details). The results with or without transmission loss
are shown in Figs. 13 and 14, respectively. These results
also suggest that the larger the efficiency mismatch (i.e.,
the smaller the efficiency η), the smaller the set of noise
parameters ω, p and r that preserve entanglement be-
comes.
Note that we cannot compare the robustness of the
two detection schemes against mismatch for verifying en-
tanglement via Figs. 11 and 13 or via Figs.12 and 14.
The reasons are as follows: First, the mismatch models
studied in Tables I and II, for the active- and passive-
detection schemes respectively, are different. There is
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FIG. 12: Minimum efficiency ηmin required for verifying en-
tanglement as a function of the depolarizing probability ω in
the channel with transmission loss. Different markers are for
different transmission losses r as labelled in the plot. Here we
consider the active-detection scheme and fix the multi-photon
probability p = 1/200. The mismatch model studied is shown
in Table I. We choose the above values of r and p just for ease
of graphical illustrations.
no one-to-one correspondence between these two mis-
match models. Second, the EVMs for different detec-
tion schemes are constructed using different sets of oper-
ators. For the active-detection scheme we use the ideal
operators in the (≤ 2)-photons subspace, whereas for the
passive-detection scheme we use the ideal operators only
in the (≤ 1)-photon subspace. The higher the number of
considered photon-number subspaces, the stronger the
entanglement-verification power of our method becomes.
Hence, the comparison of the two detection schemes via
Figs. 11 and 13 or via Figs. 12 and 14 would not be fair.
We would like to stress that we have developed a gen-
eral method for verifying entanglement with efficiency
mismatch. How to optimize our method and improve its
entanglement-verification power will require future study.
In the end, we would like to make two notes. First,
numerical results suggest that when there are no multi-
photon events the ability of our method to verify en-
tanglement does not depend on transmission loss. (The
results without multi-photon events and without trans-
mission loss are shown in Figs. 11 and 13, for the active-
and passive-detection schemes respectively.) Second, we
studied the efficiency mismatch in the experiment of
Ref. [26]. As Ref. [26] demonstrated, not only is effi-
ciency mismatched between the four detectors used in
the passive-detection scheme, but also the mismatch de-
pends on which one of the four spatial modes contains
the incoming optical signal. Ref. [26] studied two dif-
ferent cases, i.e., with or without a pinhole inserting in
front of the measurement device. When there is no pin-
hole, the observed mismatch, as shown in Table III, is
so large that successful intercept-resend attacks on the
QKD system exist [26]. When there is a pinhole, the
observed mismatch, as shown in Table IV, is reduced so
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FIG. 13: Minimum efficiency ηmin required for verifying en-
tanglement as a function of the depolarizing probability ω in
the channel without transmission loss. Different markers are
for different multi-photon probabilities p as labelled in the
plot. Here we consider the passive-detection scheme. The
mismatch model studied is shown in Table II. We choose the
above values of p just for ease of graphical illustrations.
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FIG. 14: Minimum efficiency ηmin required for verifying en-
tanglement as a function of the depolarizing probability ω in
the channel with transmission loss. Different markers are for
different transmission losses r as labelled in the plot. Here
we consider the passive-detection scheme and fix the multi-
photon probability p = 1/200. The mismatch model studied
is shown in Table II. We choose the above values of r and p
just for ease of graphical illustrations.
that our method can be used to verify entanglement.
V. Conclusion
Many methods for verifying entanglement assume that
various detectors involved in an experimental setup have
the same efficiency and that the dimension of the quan-
tum system is fixed and known. However, in practice,
the efficiencies of detectors involved in a setup usually
do not take the same value, and the tested optical sys-
tem is not well characterized. To address these prob-
TABLE III: Spatial-mode-dependent mismatch observed in
Ref. [26], when there is no pinhole. Different columns are for
different detectors labelled and shown in Fig. 1(b). Different
rows are mismatched efficiencies for different spatial modes.
Det. ‘H’ Det. ‘V ’ Det. ‘D’ Det. ‘A’
Mode 1 0.08 0 0.00106 0.00106
Mode 2 0 0.0008 0.0001 0.0001
Mode 3 0.002 0.002 0.16 0
Mode 4 0.002 0.002 0 0.04
TABLE IV: Spatial-mode-dependent mismatch observed in
Ref. [26], when there is a pinhole. Different columns are for
different detectors labelled and shown in Fig. 1(b). Different
rows are mismatched efficiencies for different spatial modes.
Det. ‘H’ Det. ‘V ’ Det. ‘D’ Det. ‘A’
Mode 1 0.0004 0 0.0002 0.0002
Mode 2 0 0.0004 0.00033 0.00033
Mode 3 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0
Mode 4 0.00033 0.00033 0 0.0004
lems, one can apply device-independent criteria, such as
violations of Bell inequalities. However, these device-
independent methods are not robust against transmission
loss. Hence, they cannot verify many entangled states
that appear in practice. Here, we present a method for
verifying entanglement when the efficiency mismatch is
characterized. Our method works without the knowl-
edge of the system dimension. The method exploits re-
lationships between measurement POVM elements, par-
ticularly those relationships between the projections of
measurement POVM elements onto the subspace that
contains only a few of photons. The projections contain
efficiency-mismatch information, and their expectation
values are connected with experimental observations by
inequalities. Hence, our method can take advantage of
efficiency-mismatch information to verify entanglement.
We implement the method by exploiting the projec-
tions of measurement POVM elements onto the (≤ 2)-
photons subspace. We expect that the entanglement-
verification power of our method becomes stronger if
a higher-photon-number subspace is considered. We
demonstrate our method with simulations. The results
show that our method can verify entanglement even
if there exists spatial-mode-dependent mismatch, which
could be induced by an adversary in the QKD scenario.
Moreover, the results show that our method is robust
against transmission loss, particularly when the projec-
tions of measurement POVM elements onto the two-
photons subspace are exploited. For the no-mismatch
case, there is another method for verifying entanglement
based on squashing models [28, 29]. This method also
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does not require any system-dimension information. The
simulation results show that our method can improve in
some cases over squashing models for verifying entangle-
ment (see Fig. 7).
We have addressed the problem of verifying entangle-
ment with efficiency mismatch even without knowing the
dimension of the system. Future work is required to
adapt the method to prove the security of QKD proto-
cols with efficiency mismatch. It is also desirable to have
an analytical proof of the monotonic behaviours of the
double-click, effective-error, or cross-click probabilities as
functions of the number of photons arriving at Bob, as
demonstrated in Figs. 2, 3, and 4. These monotonic be-
haviours are important for taking advantage of operators
in the subspace that contains only a few of photons.
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Appendix
1. Operators exploited for constructing EVMs
In the main text, we discuss only the operators ex-
ploited in the case of the active-detection scheme with
one spatial mode. Here, we will study other cases con-
sidered in the paper.
a. Active-detection scheme with two spatial modes
The idea behind constructing EVMs with two spatial
modes (e.g., for the case of the mismatch model in Ta-
ble I) is the same as that with one spatial mode studied
in Sects. III A 1 and III A 2 of the main text. We consider
both measurement POVM elements and ideal operators
in the (≤ 2)-photons subspace for constructing an EVM.
However, moving on to the two-spatial-modes case, mea-
surement POVMs change their expressions. Also, more
ideal operators in the (≤ 2)-photons subspace can be ex-
ploited. Let us discuss them in detail.
First, considering the tensor-product structure over
the two spatial modes, the expressions of measurement
POVM elements change. For example, as long as there
is a single click in one of the two spatial modes, it will
contribute to the corresponding single-click event in ex-
perimental observations. So, the POVM elements for the
single-click events in the H/V basis are
MSC = MSC,1⊗M+∅,2 +M+∅,1⊗MSC,2 +MSC,1⊗MSC,2,
(28)
where the subscript ‘SC’ can be either ‘H’ or ‘V ’, and
the subscripts ‘1’ and ‘2’ denote the two different spa-
tial modes. For each spatial mode i, i = 1, 2, the ex-
pressions of MH,i,MV,i and M
+
∅,i are the same as those
in Eq. (6) with the replacement of detection efficiencies
ηH/D and ηV/A by those efficiencies ηH/D,i and ηV/A,i
for the spatial mode i. In a similar way, we can write
down the other four POVM elements MD, MA, MHV
and MDA required for constructing an EVM. Note that
the measurement device cannot measure a photon in a
basis that involves a superposition of different spatial
modes. So, measurement POVM elements such as those
in Eq. (28) are block-diagonal with respect to various
photon-number subspaces where the number of photons
in each spatial mode is specified.
Second, as for the one-spatial-mode case, the pro-
jections of POVM elements onto the zero-photon, one-
photon, or two-photons subspaces are linear combina-
tions of ideal operators in these subspaces. The projec-
tion onto the zero-photon subspace is still expressed by
the ideal operator in the set S0 of Eq. (13). However,
to express the projections onto the one-photon and two-
photons subspaces, we need additional ideal operators.
For the one-photon case, a photon can either lie in the
spatial mode 1 or 2. So the set of ideal operators consid-
ered in Eq. (14) expands to two parallel sets
S1,1 ≡ {I2×2,1, M˜ (1)H,1, M˜ (1)D,1, σy,1} ⊗ |Vac〉2 〈Vac| (29)
and
S1,2 ≡ |Vac〉1 〈Vac| ⊗ {I2×2,2, M˜ (1)H,2, M˜ (1)D,2, σy,2}, (30)
where the second subscripts ‘1’ and ‘2’ denote the two
spatial modes. Note that in Eqs. (29) and (30), the ideal
operators for each spatial mode have the same expres-
sions as those for the one-spatial-mode case; the same is
true for the ideal operators in the equations below. For
the two-photons case, there are three possibilities: Both
photons are in the same spatial mode 1 or 2, and one
photon is in the spatial mode 1 and the other is in the
spatial mode 2. For each of the first two possibilities, the
set of ideal operators as defined in Eq. (15) becomes
S2,1 ≡{I3×3,1, M˜ (2)H,1, M˜ (2)V,1, M˜ (2)D,1, M˜ (2)A,1, Sy,1}
⊗ |Vac〉2 〈Vac| (31)
or
S2,2 ≡ |Vac〉1 〈Vac| ⊗
{I3×3,2, M˜ (2)H,2, M˜ (2)V,2, M˜ (2)D,2, M˜ (2)A,2, Sy,2}. (32)
For the case that each spatial mode holds one photon,
each spatial mode is a qubit system. To describe the
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projections of measurement POVMs onto this subspace
and also to study their operator relationships, we need
to consider the following set of ideal operators:
S2,1+2 ≡ {I2×2,1 ⊗ I2×2,2, M˜ (1)H,1 ⊗ I2×2,2, M˜ (1)D,1 ⊗ I2×2,2,
σy,1 ⊗ I2×2,2, I2×2,1 ⊗ M˜ (1)H,2, I2×2,1 ⊗ M˜ (1)D,2, I2×2,1 ⊗ σy,2}.
(33)
Moreover, in order to exploit the ideal operators within
the sets S0, S1,1, S1,2, S2,1, S2,2, and S2,1+2, we need
to know the relations between these ideal operators and
measurement POVM elements. Once we know the re-
lations, we can bound expectation values of these ideal
operators based on experimental observations. As in the
one-spatial-mode case, the idea is to express the projec-
tions of measurement POVM elements onto the (≤ 2)-
photons subspace as linear combinations of these ideal
operators. Considering the block-diagonal structure of
measurement POVM elements with respect to various
photon-number subspaces across the two spatial modes,
then the relations are established. Therefore, to con-
struct an EVM, we exploit both the measurement oper-
ators in the set S of Eq. (9) and the ideal operators in
the sets S0 of Eq. (13), S1,1 of Eq. (29), S1,2 of Eq. (30),
S2,1 of Eq. (31), S2,2 of Eq. (32), and S2,1+2 of Eq. (33).
Note that the constructed EVM can be restricted fur-
ther by considering the relationships between operators
in the above sets. The relationships between the mea-
surement operators in the set S are the same as those
discussed in Sect. III A 1 of the main text, even though
the expressions of these operators change. For each of
the other operator sets, the relationships between oper-
ators therein can be derived from those between Pauli
operators or between spin-1 operators (see Appendix 3).
Moreover, any two operators from any two different sets
of S0, S1,1, S1,2, S2,1, S2,2 and S2,1+2 are orthogonal to
each other.
b. Passive-detection scheme
In the passive-detection scheme as shown in Fig. 1(b),
there are eight possible detection events in total: No click
at any of the four detectors, click at only one of the four
detectors (single click), clicks at the two detectors at the
same output arm of the beam splitter (double click), and
clicks at two or more detectors at different output arms
of the beam splitter (cross click).
Let us first consider the operators when there is
only one spatial mode, since these operators are build-
ing blocks for more general cases. In contrast to the
active-detection case, the explicit expressions of measure-
ment POVM elements in the full state space are quite
lengthy (see Appendix 2). Denote these POVM ele-
ments by M∅, MH , MV , MD, MA, MHV , MDA, and
MCC , where the subscripts indicate measurement out-
comes and ‘CC’ means cross click. These operators are
positive-semidefinite and block-diagonal with respect to
various photon-number subspaces. Furthermore, since all
POVM elements have eigenvalues between 0 and 1, they
satisfy the following relationships:
Mi ≥MiMi ≥ 0, (34)
where i can be ∅, H, V , D, A, HV , DA, or CC. Con-
sidering that M∅ + MH + MV + MD + MA + MHV +
MDA +MCC = I where I is the identity operator in the
full state space, we utilize the operator set
S ≡ {I,MH ,MV ,MHV ,MD,MA,MDA,MCC}, (35)
to construct an EVM.
We also consider the projections of the above POVM
elements onto the (≤ 2)-photons subspace, and exploit
relationships between these projections. As in the active-
detection case, these projections are linear combinations
of ideal operators in the same subspace, where the com-
bination coefficients depend on mismatched efficiencies
(see Appendix 2 for more details). These ideal oper-
ators include those in the operator sets S0, S1 and S2
in Eqs. (13), (14) and (15). As for the active-detection
scheme, we can bound the expectation values of these
ideal operators and exploit the relationships between
them. Hence, in addition to the measurement operators
in the set S of Eq. (35) we also utilize the ideal oper-
ators in the sets S0, S1 and S2 (Eqs. (13) to (15)) for
constructing an EVM.
Next, we consider the four-spatial-modes case (e.g., the
case of the mismatch model in Table II). Considering the
tensor-product structure over the four spatial modes, the
no-click POVM element is
M∅ = M∅,1 ⊗M∅,2 ⊗M∅,3 ⊗M∅,4, (36)
where the subscripts ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’ and ‘4’ are the indices of
different spatial modes. Moreover, as long as there is a
single click in one of the four spatial modes, it will con-
tribute to the corresponding single-click event in experi-
mental observations. So the single-click POVM elements
are
MSC = M?,1 ⊗M?,2 ⊗M?,3 ⊗M?,4, (37)
where the subscript ‘SC’ can be ‘H’, ‘V ’, ‘D’ or ‘A’,
and the notation ‘?’ can be either single click ‘SC’ or
no detection ‘∅’ but at least one of M?,1, M?,2, M?,3 and
M?,4 must be the single-click POVM element for the one-
spatial-mode case. In a similar way, we can write down
the expressions of MHV , MDA and MCC . Although mea-
surement POVM elements become more complicated as
compared with the one-spatial-mode case, they still sat-
isfy the relationships in Eq. (34).
To construct an EVM, we also consider the projections
of measurement POVM elements onto the zero-photon
and one-photon subspaces. (Unlike the one-spatial-mode
case, we do not consider the projections onto the two-
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photons subspace due to the complexity of both these
operators and their relationships.) To express these pro-
jections, we need ideal operators in the zero-photon and
one-photon subspaces. For the zero-photon case, the
ideal operator needed is in the set S0 of Eq. (13). For
the one-photon case, since the photon can be in any one
of the four spatial modes, we need the following sets of
ideal operators:
S1,1 ≡{I2×2,1, M˜ (1)H,1, M˜ (1)D,1, σy,1} ⊗ |Vac〉2 〈Vac|
⊗ |Vac〉3 〈Vac| ⊗ |Vac〉4 〈Vac| , (38)
S1,2 ≡ |Vac〉1 〈Vac| ⊗ {I2×2,2, M˜ (1)H,2, M˜ (1)D,2, σy,2}
⊗ |Vac〉3 〈Vac| ⊗ |Vac〉4 〈Vac| , (39)
S1,3 ≡ |Vac〉1 〈Vac| ⊗ |Vac〉2 〈Vac|
⊗ {I2×2,3, M˜ (1)H,3, M˜ (1)D,3, σy,3} ⊗ |Vac〉4 〈Vac| ,
(40)
and
S1,4 ≡ |Vac〉1 〈Vac| ⊗ |Vac〉2 〈Vac|
⊗ |Vac〉3 〈Vac| ⊗ {I2×2,4, M˜ (1)H,4, M˜ (1)D,4, σy,4}.
(41)
The relationships between operators in each of the above
sets can be derived from those between Pauli operators
(see Appendix 3), while any two operators from any
two different sets of S0, S1,1, S1,2, S1,3 and S1,4 are
orthogonal to each other. Moreover, as for the active-
detection scheme, we can bound the expectation values
of these ideal operators based on experimental obser-
vations. Therefore, to construct an EVM for the four-
spatial-modes case, we utilize not only the measurement
operators in the set S of Eq. (35) but also the ideal op-
erators in the sets S0 of Eq. (13), S1,1 of Eq. (38), S1,2
of Eq. (39), S1,3 of Eq. (40) and S1,4 of Eq. (41).
2. POVM elements with mismatched efficiencies
We first consider the active-detection scheme as shown
in Fig. 1(a). Suppose that the two threshold detectors
have efficiencies ηH/D and ηV/A, respectively. Recall that
a real threshold detector can be described by an ideal
threshold detector with a beam splitter in front whose
transmission coefficient is equal to the square root of the
real detector’s efficiency [34]. It then turns out that the
measurement in the H/V basis can be described by an
optical device with three input spatial directions labelled
by numbers and four output spatial directions labelled
by lower-case letters, as shown in Fig. 15. In order to
realize the measurement, however, only the input spatial
direction 1 has incoming optical signals, whereas no sig-
nals travel along the other two input spatial directions 2
and 3. To get an outcome, the output modes Ha and Vc
are measured with ideal threshold detectors, whereas the
other two output modes Hb and Vd are not detected cor-
responding to the loss in the measurement process. (Note
that here and later we use both the polarization degree
of freedom and the spatial degree of freedom to label an
input or output mode.) Therefore, it is straightforward
to write down POVM elements in the output-modes ba-
sis {|nHa , nHb , nVc , nVd〉 , nHa , nHb , nVc , nVd = 0, 1, 2, ...}.
For example, the POVM element for the single-click event
‘H’ is written as
MH =
∞∑
nHa=1
∞∑
nHb=0
∞∑
nVd=0
|nHa , nHb , 0Vc , nVd〉 〈nHa , nHb , 0Vc , nVd | . (42)
Using the fact |n〉 = 1√
n!
(aˆ†)n |0〉, Eq. (42) becomes
MH =
∞∑
nHa=1
∞∑
nHb=0
∞∑
nVd=0
1
nHa !nHb !nVd !(
aˆ†Ha
)nHa (
aˆ†Hb
)nHb (
aˆ†Vd
)nVd |0〉 〈0|
(aˆHa)
nHa (aˆHb)
nHb (aˆVd)
nVd , (43)
where aˆ and aˆ† are annihilation and creation operators
associated with an optical mode, respectively.
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FIG. 15: Description of the measurement in the H/V ba-
sis under the active-detection scheme. Suppose that the de-
tection efficiencies associated with the outcomes H and V
are ηH/D and ηV/A, respectively, and that the two detectors
shown are ideal. Then, the beam splitters BSH and BSV have
transmission coefficients
√
ηH/D and
√
ηV/A, respectively.
To express the POVM element MH in the input-modes
basis, we utilize the relations between the creation oper-
ators of the input and output modes of a beam splitter.
Specifically, the relations
aˆ†Ha =
√
ηH/Daˆ
†
H1
+
√
1− ηH/Daˆ†H2 ,
aˆ†Hb = −
√
1− ηH/Daˆ†H1 +
√
ηH/Daˆ
†
H2
, and
aˆ†Vd = −
√
1− ηV/Aaˆ†V1 +
√
ηV/Aaˆ
†
V3
. (44)
Using Eq. (44), we can express MH in terms of the cre-
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ation operators aˆ†H1 , aˆ
†
V1
, aˆ†H2 and aˆ
†
V3
and the annihila-
tion operators aˆH1 , aˆV1 , aˆH2 and aˆV3 . Further, to fulfill
the physical condition that there is no incoming optical
signal travelling along the spatial directions 2 or 3, we
need to pick only the terms where there is no appearance
of any of the operators aˆ†H2 , aˆ
†
V3
, aˆH2 , and aˆV3 . Therefore,
we get that
MH =
∞∑
nHa=1
∞∑
nHb=0
∞∑
nVd=0
1
nHa !nHb !nVd !
(ηH/D)
nHa (1− ηH/D)nHb (1− ηV/A)nVd
(
aˆ†H1
)nHa+nHb(
aˆ†V1
)nVd |0〉 〈0| (aˆH1)nHa+nHb (aˆV1)nVd . (45)
Using the fact that (aˆ†)n |0〉 = √n! |n〉, and setting that
nH1 = nHa + nHb and nV1 = nVd , we can simplify the
above equation to
MH =
∞∑
nH1=1
∞∑
nV1=0
(
1− (1− ηH/D)nH1
)
(1− ηV/A)nV1
|nH1 , nV1〉 〈nH1 , nV1 | . (46)
The above equation is the same as that in Eq. (6) of
the main text, except that each polarization mode has a
subscript ‘1’ indicating the input spatial direction.
Likewise, we can derive the other POVM elements for
the measurement in the H/V basis, and the results are
as follows:
MV =
∞∑
nH1=0
∞∑
nV1=1
(1− ηH/D)nH1
(
1− (1− ηV/A)nV1
)
|nH1 , nV1〉 〈nH1 , nV1 | ,
MHV =
∞∑
nH1=1
∞∑
nV1=1
(
1− (1− ηH/D)nH1
) (
1− (1− ηV/A)nV1
)
|nH1 , nV1〉 〈nH1 , nV1 | , and
M+∅ =
∞∑
nH1=0
∞∑
nV1=0
(1− ηH/D)nH1 (1− ηV/A)nV1
|nH1 , nV1〉 〈nH1 , nV1 | , (47)
where the superscript ‘+’ denotes the H/V basis.
We can follow the same procedure as above to derive
the POVM elements for the measurement in the D/A
basis under the active-detection scheme. We skip the
details and just list the POVM elements as follows:
MD =
∞∑
nD1=1
∞∑
nA1=0
(
1− (1− ηH/D)nD1
)
(1− ηV/A)nA1
|nD1 , nA1〉 〈nD1 , nA1 | ,
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FIG. 16: Description of the measurement under the passive-
detection scheme. Suppose that the detection efficiencies as-
sociated with the outcomes H, V , D and A are ηH , ηV , ηD
and ηA respectively, and that the four detectors shown are
ideal. Then, the beam splitters BSH , BSV , BSD and BSA
have transmission coefficients
√
ηH ,
√
ηV ,
√
ηD and
√
ηA, re-
spectively.
MA =
∞∑
nD1=0
∞∑
nA1=1
(1− ηH/D)nD1
(
1− (1− ηV/A)nA1
)
|nD1 , nA1〉 〈nD1 , nA1 | ,
MDA =
∞∑
nD1=1
∞∑
nA1=1
(
1− (1− ηH/D)nD1
) (
1− (1− ηV/A)nA1
)
|nD1 , nA1〉 〈nD1 , nA1 | , and
M×∅ =
∞∑
nD1=0
∞∑
nA1=0
(1− ηH/D)nD1 (1− ηV/A)nA1
|nD1 , nA1〉 〈nD1 , nA1 | . (48)
Here, the superscript ‘×’ denotes the D/A basis, and the
subscript ‘1’ of the polarization mode denotes the input
spatial direction.
Next, let us study the passive-detection case. With
the help of the beam-splitter model for a real detec-
tor with imperfect efficiency, we can see that the whole
measurement can be described by an optical device with
six input spatial directions and eight output spatial di-
rections, as shown in Fig. 16. To realize the mea-
surement, only the input spatial direction 1 has incom-
ing optical signals, and only the output modes Ha, Vc,
De and Ag are measured (by ideal detectors). It is
straightforward to see that in the output-modes basis
{∣∣nHa , nHb , nVc , nVd , nDe , nDf , nAg , nAh〉 , nHa , nHb , nVc ,
nVd , nDe , nDf , nAg , nAh = 0, 1, 2, ...}, the POVM element
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for the single-click event ‘H’ is written as
MH =
∞∑
nHa=1
∞∑
nHb=0
∞∑
nVd=0
∞∑
nDf=0
∞∑
nAh=0∣∣nHa , nHb , 0Vc , nVd , 0De , nDf , 0Ag , nAh〉〈
nHa , nHb , 0Vc , nVd , 0De , nDf , 0Ag , nAh
∣∣ . (49)
To express the above POVM element MH in the input-
modes basis, as for the active-detection case, we use the
fact that |n〉 = 1√
n!
(aˆ†)n |0〉 and the relations between
the creation operators of the input and output modes
of a beam splitter. Here, we skip the lengthy but not
difficult details, and just write down the final expression
of MH as follows:
MH =
∞∑
nHa=1
∞∑
nHb=0
∞∑
nVd=0
∞∑
nDf=0
∞∑
nAh=0
(
1
2
)nHa+nHb+nVd+nDf+nAh
1
nHa !nHb !nVd !nDf !nAh !
(ηH)
nHa (1− ηH)nHb (1− ηV )nVd (1− ηD)nDf (1− ηA)nAh(
aˆ†H1
)nHa+nHb (
aˆ†V1
)nVd (
aˆ†D1
)nDf (
aˆ†A1
)nAh |0〉 〈0| (aˆH1)nHa+nHb (aˆV1)nVd (aˆD1)nDf (aˆA1)nAh . (50)
Likewise, we can get the following results:
MV =
∞∑
nHb=0
∞∑
nVc=1
∞∑
nVd=0
∞∑
nDf=0
∞∑
nAh=0
(
1
2
)nHb+nVc+nVd+nDf+nAh
1
nHb !nVc !nVd !nDf !nAh !
(1− ηH)nHb (ηV )nVc (1− ηV )nVd (1− ηD)nDf (1− ηA)nAh(
aˆ†H1
)nHb (
aˆ†V1
)nVc+nVd (
aˆ†D1
)nDf (
aˆ†A1
)nAh |0〉 〈0| (aˆH1)nHb (aˆV1)nVc+nVd (aˆD1)nDf (aˆA1)nAh ,
MD =
∞∑
nHb=0
∞∑
nVd=0
∞∑
nDe=1
∞∑
nDf=0
∞∑
nAh=0
(
1
2
)nHb+nVd+nDe+nDf+nAh
1
nHb !nVd !nDe !nDf !nAh !
(1− ηH)nHb (1− ηV )nVd (ηD)nDe (1− ηD)nDf (1− ηA)nAh(
aˆ†H1
)nHb (
aˆ†V1
)nVd (
aˆ†D1
)nDe+nDf (
aˆ†A1
)nAh |0〉 〈0| (aˆH1)nHb (aˆV1)nVd (aˆD1)nDe+nDf (aˆA1)nAh ,
MA =
∞∑
nHb=0
∞∑
nVd=0
∞∑
nDf=0
∞∑
nAg=1
∞∑
nAh=0
(
1
2
)nHb+nVd+nDf+nAg+nAh
1
nHb !nVd !nDf !nAg !nAh !
(1− ηH)nHb (1− ηV )nVd (1− ηD)nDf (ηA)nAg (1− ηA)nAh(
aˆ†H1
)nHb (
aˆ†V1
)nVd (
aˆ†D1
)nDf (
aˆ†A1
)nAg+nAh |0〉 〈0| (aˆH1)nHb (aˆV1)nVd (aˆD1)nDf (aˆA1)nAg+nAh ,
MHV =
∞∑
nHa=1
∞∑
nHb=0
∞∑
nVc=1
∞∑
nVd=0
∞∑
nDf=0
∞∑
nAh=0
(
1
2
)nHa+nHb+nVc+nVd+nDf+nAh
1
nHa !nHb !nVc !nVd !nDf !nAh !
(ηH)
nHa (1− ηH)nHb (ηV )nVc (1− ηV )nVd (1− ηD)nDf (1− ηA)nAh(
aˆ†H1
)nHa+nHb (
aˆ†V1
)nVc+nVd (
aˆ†D1
)nDf (
aˆ†A1
)nAh |0〉 〈0| (aˆH1)nHa+nHb (aˆV1)nVc+nVd (aˆD1)nDf (aˆA1)nAh ,
19
MDA =
∞∑
nHb=0
∞∑
nVd=0
∞∑
nDe=1
∞∑
nDf=0
∞∑
nAg=1
∞∑
nAh=0
(
1
2
)nHb+nVd+nDe+nDf+nAg+nAh
1
nHb !nVd !nDe !nDf !nAg !nAh !
(1− ηH)nHb (1− ηV )nVd (ηD)nDe (1− ηD)nDf (ηA)nAg (1− ηA)nAh(
aˆ†H1
)nHb (
aˆ†V1
)nVd (
aˆ†D1
)nDe+nDf (
aˆ†A1
)nAg+nAh |0〉 〈0| (aˆH1)nHb (aˆV1)nVd (aˆD1)nDe+nDf (aˆA1)nAg+nAh ,
and
M∅ =
∞∑
nHb=0
∞∑
nVd=0
∞∑
nDf=0
∞∑
nAh=0
(
1
2
)nHb+nVd+nDf+nAh
1
nHb !nVd !nDf !nAh !
(1− ηH)nHb (1− ηV )nVd (1− ηD)nDf (1− ηA)nAh
(
aˆ†H1
)nHb (
aˆ†V1
)nVd
(
aˆ†D1
)nDf (
aˆ†A1
)nAh |0〉 〈0| (aˆH1)nHb (aˆV1)nVd (aˆD1)nDf (aˆA1)nAh . (51)
There is no obvious simplification of Eqs. (50) and (51),
but from these expressions it is straightforward to see
that the POVM elements are linear combinations of ideal
operators where the combination coefficients are deter-
mined by the mismatched efficiencies ηH , ηV , ηD and
ηA. Note that we did not write down the POVM ele-
ment MCC for cross-click events, since it can be inferred
from the fact M∅ + MH + MV + MD + MA + MHV +
MDA +MCC = I where I is the identity operator in the
full state space.
3. Relationships between ideal operators
To figure out the relationships between the ideal oper-
ators in Eq. (11), we note that these ideal operators are
related to Pauli operators (or spin- 12 operators)
σx =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, σy =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
, and σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, (52)
and spin-1 operators
Sx =
1√
2
 0 1 01 0 1
0 1 0
 , Sy = 1√
2
 0 −i 0i 0 −i
0 i 0
 , and Sz =
 1 0 00 0 0
0 0 −1
 . (53)
Particularly, in the basis {|1H , 0V 〉 , |0H , 1V 〉} of the one-
photon subspace we have
2M˜
(1)
H − I2×2 = σz and 2M˜ (1)D − I2×2 = σx, (54)
and in the basis {|2H , 0V 〉 , |1H , 1V 〉 , |0H , 2V 〉} of the two-
photons subspace we have
M˜
(2)
H − M˜ (2)V = Sz and M˜ (2)D − M˜ (2)A = Sx. (55)
So, we can derive the relationships between the ideal op-
erators in Eq. (11) from those between Pauli operators
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or between spin-1 operators, for example, from
σaσb = iεabcσc + δabI2×2, or [Sa, Sb] = iεabcSc, (56)
where εabc is the Levi-Civita symbol, δab is the Kronecker
delta function, and each of a, b and c can be x, y or z.
In the same way, we can derive the relationships
between the ideal operators in Eqs. (29) to (33) and
Eqs. (38) to (41).
4. Proof of the equivalence of the descriptions in
Fig. 5
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FIG. 17: Two equivalent descriptions of the measurement
in the H/V basis under the active-detection scheme: (a) is
the actual situation (the same as Fig. 5(a)), and (b) is the
hypothetical situation (the same as Fig. 5(b)). Suppose that
the detection efficiencies associated with the outcomes H and
V can be written as η0η1 and η0η2 respectively, where 0 ≤
η0, η1, η2 ≤ 1. Then, to realize the measurement, each beam
splitter as shown has a transmission coefficient
√
η0, and the
output modes Ha and Vc are detected by real detectors with
efficiencies η1 and η2, respectively. The two real detectors are
not shown for simplicity. Note that the other output modes
Hb and Vd in (a) and He and Ve in (b) are not detected,
corresponding to the loss in the measurement process.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the mea-
surement is performed in the H/V basis. From Ap-
pendix 2, we already know the POVM elements for
the measurement described in Fig. 5(a), i.e., Eqs. (46)
and (47) with the replacement of ηH/D and ηV/A by
η0η1 and η0η2, respectively. To prove the equivalence,
we can derive the POVM elements for the measurement
described in Fig. 5(b). However, this approach is quite
lengthy. To simplify the proof and make the idea behind
clear, we take another approach.
It is straightforward to see that Fig. 5(a) (or Fig. 5(b))
is the same as Fig. 17(a) (or Fig. 17(b)) where only the
input spatial direction 1 has incoming optical signals and
only the output modes Ha and Vc are detected (by real
detectors with efficiencies η1 and η2 respectively). The
optical devices in Fig. 17(a) and Fig. 17(b) are equivalent
because of the well-known result that the common loss η0
in the two output arms of a polarizing beam splitter can
also be introduced by inserting a beam splitter with a
transmission coefficient
√
η0 for both polarization modes
into the input arm of the polarizing beam splitter.
5. Proof of the equivalence of the descriptions in
Fig. 6
In the passive-detection scheme as shown in Fig. 1(b),
each output arm of the 50/50 beam splitter is a setup
for the active-detection scheme, i.e., a polarizing beam
splitter with a detector in each output arm of the po-
larizing beam splitter. From Fig. 17 of Appendix 4, we
already see that a common loss in the two output arms
of a polarizing beam splitter can be introduced either by
inserting a beam splitter into each output arm or by in-
serting the same beam splitter into the input arm of the
polarizing beam splitter. Hence, to prove the equivalence
of Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(b), we only need to further prove
that a common loss in the two output arms of a 50/50
beam splitter as shown in Fig. 18(a) is equivalent to the
same common loss in the two input arms of the 50/50
beam splitter as shown in Fig. 18(b). This equivalence is
well established in quantum optics, so here we skip the
proof.
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FIG. 18: Two equivalent descriptions of a 50/50 beam splitter
with a common loss in the two output arms: (a) is the case
where the loss is introduced in each output arm, and (b) is the
case where the loss is introduced in each input arm. Suppose
that the common loss is η0. Then, each beam splitter as
shown has a transmission coefficient
√
η0. The whole optical
device in each case has four input spatial directions and four
output spatial directions.
6. Details of the SDP problem
In Sect. III D of the main text, we formulate entangle-
ment verification as a SDP feasibility problem of the form
in Eq. (26). Here we provide more details of the SDP
problem to be solved for the case of the active-detection
scheme with one spatial mode. The SDP problems for
the other cases studied in the paper can be formulated
in the same way.
For the ideal BB84-QKD prepare-and-measure proto-
col studied in Sect. IV A, Alice’s system is equivalently
described by a qubit, and her measurements are equiv-
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alently described by the H/V -basis measurement and
the D/A-basis measurement (suppose that information
is encoded in the polarization degree of freedom). In
the construction of an EVM χ, to take advantage of the
complete knowledge of Alice’s state and measurements,
we set the operators at Alice’s side to be Aˆ1 = |φ〉 〈H|
and Aˆ2 = |φ〉 〈V |, where |φ〉 is an arbitrary qubit state.
As discussed in Sects. III A 1 and III A 2, for Bob’s side
we consider both the actual measurement operators in
Eq. (9) and the ideal operators in Eqs. (13), (14) and (15).
Denote the sets of operators exploited at Alice’s side and
Bob’s side by SA and SB , respectively. There are 2 op-
erators in the set SA and 18 operators in the set SB .
Hence, the constructed EVM χ has a dimension of 36×36.
We can constrain the EVM χ by the complete knowl-
edge of Alice’s state and measurements, by Alice’s and
Bob’s observations pAB(x, y) with x ∈ {H,V,D,A} and
y ∈ {H,V,D,A,HV,DA} (i.e., the probabilities that Al-
ice observes outcomes x while Bob observes outcomes y),
by operator relationships, and by the bounds of the num-
ber of photons arriving at Bob as discussed in Sect. III B.
In the following, we will discuss these constraints in de-
tail.
First, let us discuss which entries of the EVM χ are
fixed, given Alice’s state ρA and also the observations
of Alice and Bob pAB(x, y). Recall that the EVM en-
tries χij,kl are the expectation values of the operators
Aˆ†i Aˆk ⊗ Bˆ†j Bˆl, where Aˆi, Aˆk ∈ SA and Bˆj , Bˆl ∈ SB .
So, we only need to figure out which operators’ expec-
tation values are known given ρA and pAB(x, y). It
is obvious to see that the expectation values of Aˆ†i Aˆk
and Aˆ†i Aˆi ⊗ Bˆm are known, where i, k = 1, 2 and
Bˆm denotes one of Bob’s actual measurement operators
in Eq. (9). In total, there are 16 constraints of this
type for the case of the active-detection scheme with
one spatial mode. Moreover, considering the relation
Aˆ†1Aˆ2 = (|D〉 〈D| − |A〉 〈A| − |D〉 〈A| + |A〉 〈D|)/2 and
the fact that both the actual measurement operators Bˆm
of Bob and the joint state of Alice and Bob can be repre-
sented by real-valued matrices (see the discussion below
Eq. (18)), it is easy to figure out the expectation values of
Aˆ†1Aˆ2 ⊗ Bˆm given Alice’s and Bob’s observations. In the
same way, we can also figure out the expectation values
of Aˆ†2Aˆ1 ⊗ Bˆm. In total, there are 12 constraints of this
type for the case of the active-detection scheme with one
spatial mode.
Second, we discuss the equality constraints on the
EVM entries χij,kl. There are three different kinds of
equality constraints. The first kind is due to the relation-
ships between operators exploited. For example, if two
operators Bˆj and Bˆl commute and they are Hermitian,
then by the definition in Eq. (2) the two EVM entries
χij,kl and χil,kj are equal to each other, ∀i, k. Particu-
larly if the two operators Bˆj and Bˆl are orthogonal to
each other (for example, Bˆj and Bˆl are operators in dif-
ferent photon-number subspaces), then the entries χij,kl
and χil,kj are zeros. We formulated 188 constraints of
this type for the case of the active-detection scheme with
one spatial mode. More equality constraints on the EVM
entries can be derived by the commutation relationships
as discussed in Appendix 3. We derived 72 constraints
of this type for the case of the active-detection scheme
with one spatial mode. The second kind of equality con-
straints is due to the fact that some operators exploited
are represented by real-valued matrices. In this case, the
corresponding EVM entries will be real numbers, since
for entanglement verification we only need to consider the
states ρAB which are represented by real-valued matri-
ces (see the discussion below Eq. (18)). We formulated 34
constraints of this type for the case of the active-detection
scheme with one spatial mode. The last kind of equal-
ity constraints is due to the fact that the projections
of measurement POVM elements onto the (≤ 2)-photons
subspace can be expressed as linear combinations of ideal
operators in this subspace (for example, see Eq. (10)). So,
we can formulate the corresponding equality constraints.
For the case of the active-detection scheme with one spa-
tial mode, there are 320 such constraints.
Third, let us consider the inequality constraints on
the EVM entries χij,kl. First, such constraints can
be derived from operator relationships. Suppose that
0 ≤ BˆjBˆl ≤ Bˆj , Bˆj and Bˆl are Hermitian, and Bˆ1 is
the identity operator in the full state space of Bob’s sys-
tem; then we have 0 ≤ χil,ij , χij,il ≤ χi1,ij since the
operators Aˆ†i Aˆi with i = 1, 2 are positive-semidefinite.
These constraints can be derived from the operator re-
lationships in Eq. (7). In the same way, we can also de-
rive inequality constraints from Eq. (12). We formulated
108 constraints of this type for the case of the active-
detection scheme with one spatial mode. Second, there
is another way to derive inequality constraints, that is, by
bounding the probabilities that the state lies in various
photon-number subspaces. For example, we can derive
an inequality constraint from Eq. (21). This is because
given the observed double-click probability dobs and the
optimized value d3,min all the other parameters p0, p1, p2
and p2d2 in Eq. (21) can be written as linear combina-
tions of EVM entries. In the same way, we can derive an
inequality constraint from Eq. (22). We formulated 16
constraints of this type for the case of the active-detection
scheme with one spatial mode.
In a nutshell, by considering all the above linear con-
straints on the entries of the constructed EVM χ, we can
formulate entanglement verification as a SDP feasibility
problem of the form in Eq. (26).
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